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Abstract—Cybercrime forums enable modern criminal en-
trepreneurs to collaborate with other criminals into increasingly
efficient and sophisticated criminal endeavors. Understanding the
connections between different products and services can often
illuminate effective interventions. However, generating this un-
derstanding of supply chains currently requires time-consuming
manual effort.
In this paper, we propose a language-agnostic method to
automatically extract supply chains from cybercrime forum posts
and replies. Our supply chain detection algorithm can identify
36% and 58% relevant chains within major English and Russian
forums, respectively, showing improvements over the baselines of
13% and 36%, respectively. Our analysis of the automatically
generated supply chains demonstrates underlying connections
between products and services within these forums. For example,
the extracted supply chain illuminated the connection between
hack-for-hire services and the selling of rare and valuable
‘OG’ accounts, which has only recently been reported. The
understanding of connections between products and services
exposes potentially effective intervention points.
Index Terms—Security, Cybercrime, Natural Language Pro-
cessing
I. INTRODUCTION
Cybercrime-as-a-Service lowers the barrier to entry for
new cybercriminals by commoditizing different parts of at-
tacks [37]. For example, without commoditization, a spammer
needs to find a way to send e-mails, acquire mailing lists,
create storefront websites, contract with web hosting, register
domains, manage product fulfillment, accept online payments,
and provide customer service. With commoditization, the
spammer can outsource different responsibilities to different
criminals specialized in one specific task. Cybercriminals often
rely on underground cybercrime forums to establish these
trade relationships that can facilitate the exchange of illicit
goods and services. These cybercrime forums thus play a
crucial role in increasing efficiency and promoting innovation
in the cybercrime ecosystem. However, these dependencies can
also provide opportunities to undermine a spammer at more
vulnerable points such as the online payment channel [25].
The supply chain of a cybercrime can illuminate the se-
quence of processes involved in the criminal activities. Prior
work has shown that analyzing these supply chains can result
in identifying weak points which could enable effective inter-
ventions [8]. There have been several studies exploring specific
instance of these commoditized cybercrime offerings [4], [7],
[40] and how some attacks can be more effectively undermined
once their dependencies to other services are understood [18],
[28], [29], [38]. However, we as a community do not have
any systematic methods of identifying these supply chains that
enable more sophisticated and streamlined attacks. Currently
analysts often manually investigate cybercrime forums to
understand these supply chains, which is a time-consuming
process [19].
In this paper, we propose, implement, and evaluate a
framework to systematically identify relevant supply chains
present in cybercrime forums. Our framework is composed of
several components which include automated methods based
on supervised Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques
and a graph-traversal algorithm. Our approach classifies the
product category from a forum post, identifies the replies
indicating that a user bought or sold a product, then builds
an interaction graph and uses a graph traversal algorithm to
discover links of related product buying and subsequent selling
posts. Our approach is language agnostic and does not require
manual categorizations of products, an improvement over prior
work on product detection [33].
We used our end-to-end supply chain identification pipeline
to analyze two publicly available cybercrime forums and are
able to identify 36% and 58% relevant links in our English
language and Russian language forums, respectively. These
are supply chain links where users are buying products that
are likely used to facilitate subsequent product offerings (i.e.,
a user buying OSN reputation boosting services to groom
accounts that are then sold to scammers) or users reselling
products after they are no longer useful to their original owner.
This is an increase from our baselines of 13% and 36%,
respectively.
The main contributions of our paper are the following:
* We develop, implement and evaluate an automated
approach for discovering the cybercrime supply chain
(Section IV). Our method uses language agnostic NLP
methods and graph traversal to automate the discovery
of the supply chains.
* We perform an analysis of our automatically generated
supply chains to provide an understanding of how some
commodity cybercrime products depend on other offer-
ings within these forums (Section VI).
* We distill our findings from the detected supply chains
into several qualitative case studies (Section VII). These
case studies highlight that we were efficiently able to dis-
cover supplies chains exposing the connection between
the purchasing of hack-for-hire services and the selling
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of valuable online accounts. Despite this connection
being present in the forums for years, it has only recently
been discovered based on manual analysis [22]. This
connection suggests a potentially more effective method
of mitigating the theft of valuable online accounts by
avoiding account authentication and recovery methods
based on mobile phone numbers.
The rest of this paper is structured in the following way.
Section II discusses background and related work in this area,
including past work which uses the same data. Section III
outlines the data used to validate our approach. Section IV
outlines our approach and contributions in classification and
supply chain discovery. We evaluate our work empirically
to demonstrate how our approach performs better than the
baseline in Section V, and analyze the forums using our
results in Section VI. Section VII outlines several real world
scenarios where the generated supply chains add value to an
investigation. Section VIII identifies limitations and discusses
the implication of our results. We conclude in Section IX.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Cybercriminal forums provide a unique opportunity to un-
derstand how criminal markets operate. Criminals rely on these
forums to establish trade relationships and facilitate exchanges
of goods and information. The typical forum structure follows
the subforum > thread > post > reply hierarchy.
A subforum typically pertains to a particular subject: for
example, marketplace or introductions. Users then
can create threads within subforums where a thread is a
collection of messages. Each thread will always contain a first
post, which in this paper, we will use interchangeably with
product post. We will also use the term reply post
to refer to the posts which come after the product post in each
thread. This is a key part of detecting relevant supply chains
based on public information.
Several prior works studied the organization of the cyber-
crime forums [1], [24], [26], [30], profiling key actors [31],
products traded [12], [14], [35], [41], evolution over time [2],
[13], and ways to disrupt their business [9], [16]. However,
these works either rely on the structural information on a
forum or use handcrafted regular expression. Some prior work
used machine learning to scale the analysis of these forums.
Portnoff et al. [33] used supervised machine learning to
automatically identify the type of a post (buy or sell), prod-
ucts being traded and the price of the products. Unlike
their approach, our approach is language agnostic, which we
demonstrate by analyzing both English and Russian forums.
Caines et al. [5] recently explored classifying posts by intents,
which is similar to how we classify replies as indicating buying
or selling activity. Unlike their approach to classifying replies,
we focus on identifying replies that strongly indicate that the
forum member has actually bought or sold that product as
opposed to expressing an intent to buy or sell a product. This
is more useful for detecting likely supply chains.
Other work has explored the progression of illicit activi-
ties by forum members [32]. Wegberg et al. [39] analyzed
longitudinal data from eight structured online anonymous
marketplaces over six years to understand the value change
and commoditization of the criminal markets as “cybercrime-
as-a-service”. They concluded that commoditization in the
cybercrime market is still limited. Our work complements
and extends this line of research by providing a method for
detecting connections between products.
Our approach goes beyond understanding the trust estab-
lishment, organization, aggregate activity, and classification
performed in prior work. We use the results of our classifiers
to identify semantically meaningful forum interactions and
automatically discover supply chains of the products that can
improve our understanding of how these markets function in
practice. We analyzed the connections between products in
unstructured cybercrime forums and noticed mostly business-
to-business (we scope this to mean “sale to the trade” where
the products being bought and sold often have no value except
as a building block to enable an attack) transactions. This
allows us to study the criminal-to-criminal supply chains that
enable attacks. Some of these were previously studied from
the direct attackers and victims’ perspectives, such as romance
scams [15]. Our new understanding of the underlying supply
chains can illuminate different and potentially more effective
methods of undermining these threats [25].
III. FORUMS
To evaluate our approach, we chose two popular forums:
Antichat (Russian) and Hack Forums (English) (Table I). We
chose these forums because they are large, publicly avail-
able, and have been used to evaluate cybercrime analysis
methodologies in prior studies [10], [33]. We also have access
to more recent data from these two forums and other large
cybercrime forums through an agreement with a security
company. However, this data is private and our agreement
prevents us from publicly sharing these datasets. Thus, in this
paper we chose to limit our evaluation to public datasets so
as to enable reproducibility of our major findings.
a) Hack Forums: Hack Forums is a major English-
language forum covering many cybercrime-related topics. The
forum has been active since 2007. We use a partial 6 year
scrape between April 2009 and April 2015. The scrape is
partial because it only includes sell posts from the Hack
Forums Marketplace.
b) Antichat: Antichat is a major Russian-language forum
covering cybercrime-related topics. Examples include pass-
word cracking, stolen accounts, and physical weaponry. We
obtain a full database leak containing posts between January
2005 and June 2010.
A. Availability and Ethics
The two data sources used in this study are a scrape
of public postings from Hack Forums and publicly leaked
dump of Antichat cybercrime forums. Both of these datasets
are publicly available data and have been analyzed in prior
studies [10], [33]. The validity of this data has been es-
tablished by these prior studies. Our analysis focuses on
Total threads Total replies Unique authors Total messages Date range
Antichat 73,115 287,089 20,540 328,215 05/2003 - 06/2010
Hack Forums 14,447 46,786 12,625 61,233 04/2009 - 04/2015
Table I: Forum overviews
Posts
Replies
Classify  
product categories
Classify  
reply categories
Build  
interaction graph 
Build  
supply chain 
Forum users
Figure 1: Our supply chain detection approach.
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Figure 2: Example of constructing supply chains from two Hack Forums threads.
creating and evaluating generalizable methods for constructing
supply chains. We did not attempt to analyze any Personally
Identifiable Information (PII) in these datasets. All case studies
mentioned in section VII are anonymized except for those that
have been previously publicly reported, and so are any analysts
mentioned. This study was exempted by our Institutional
Review Board (IRB) since the datasets were publicly available
and the focus of our study was not on analyzing PII in the
dataset. Our methods conform to recommended best practices
for ethical research pertaining to datasets of illicit origin [36].
In order to facilitate reproducibility, we will make available
upon request to other researchers all of the data, annotations
and code for our study. However, we will not make the data
publicly available in a way where it might be indexed by
search engines and increase the possible harm from any PII
contained in these datasets.
IV. APPROACH
Our goal is to automatically build a supply chain for a
criminal forum by analyzing the posts and replies. To build
a supply chain, we need a chronological record of which
products the users of a forum are buying and selling. We use
automated classifiers to categorize the posts and replies, then
build an interaction graph and use the graph to build the supply
chain (Figure 1).
A. Classify Product
To find a supply chain, we need to first identify the
categories of the product bought or sold in forum posts. We use
supervised classification to classify products into n categories,
where the specific categories might depend on the forum and
the analyst. The details of our classifier will be presented in
section V.
B. Classify Replies
Once we have the product categories, we need to identify
who bought or sold the products to build a supply chain.
The reply classifier is similar to the product classifier. It is
a supervised classifier that uses TF-IDF of character n-grams
to classify replies into three main categories: buy, sell and
other. To classify only relevant replies, we run a quote
removal algorithm to remove instances of a reply quoting a
previous reply before feeding it to the reply classifier.
C. Build an Interaction Graph
To determine who bought what and when, we build an
interaction graph for a forum. The interaction graph is a
directed graph, G = (U,E) where each node u ∈ U is a
user who posts on the forum, and each edge (ua, ub) ∈ E
indicates that user ua sold a product to user ub.
To build this graph, we use the product and reply classi-
fiers. For a post by ua, the product classifier determines the
category of the product sold in the post and the reply classifier
determines whether user ub’s reply to ua’s post implies buying
the product. We also consider the time of the buy reply as the
time at which the user ub purchased the item from user ua.
D. Build Supply Chain
The purpose of a supply chain graph is to illuminate the
sequence of processes involved in various criminal activities.
The supply chain graph of a forum is a directed graph, S =
(C, I), where each node, ci ∈ C, is a product category and
each edge, (ca, cb) ∈ I , indicates that at least one user in the
forum bought a category ca product and sold a category cb
product. We use breadth-first search on the interaction graph
to create the supply chain. Figure 2 shows an example of
creating a supply chain from two Hack Forums threads.
To create the supply chain graph, we define a supply chain
link in an interaction graph as a tuple of two interactions ea
and eb, where ea is an edge from user ua to user ub, and eb is
an edge from ub to uc. This means that user ua sold a product
to user ub, who then sold a product to user uc. Our breadth-
first search follows the supply chain links in the interaction
graph in chronological order (Algorithm 1).
When adding links to the supply chain graph, we do not
want users who are outliers disproportionately buying or
selling certain items to unfairly add to their links. For example,
somebody might buy 100 items and then sell once, adding 100
links (an exaggeration of the problem). We mitigate this issue
by dividing the weight that each user contributes to each link
by the total number of links to which that user contributes.
Our method of attenuation is: If a user appears in n edges,
then that user adds 1/n to each edge in which they appear;
so, each user adds a total of 1 to the entire graph, and each link
still appears, but contributes less than if that user only created
one or a few links with a single purchase. These weights after
attenuation are used later in section VI. For example, if user A
sold one product to user B and then user B sold 50 products to
other buyers this would be attenuated to only a single supply
chain.
V. EVALUATION
To evaluate our approach, we first label each post from our
Antichat and Hack Forums datasets into product categories
and each reply into reply categories. Using our labeled data
as groundtruth, we evaluate the performance of the classifiers
and end-to-end supply chain link algorithm.
A. Labeling Ground Truth
We perform two types of labeling: Product labeling and
Reply labeling. Unlike prior work that annotates the head of
a noun phrase describing a product [10], [33], we label each
post into one of the predetermined categories. This approach
Supply Chain Algorithm 1: Modified Breadth-First
Search for Supply Chain Generation
1 Input: Interaction graph, G = (U,E) where u ∈ U ←
user and (ua, ub) ∈ E ← user ua sold to user ub
2 Output: Supply chain graph, S = (C, I), where
ci ∈ C ← product category and (ca, cb) ∈ I ← users
bought a ca product and sold a cb product
3 while not every user u ∈ U has been discovered do
4 L1← undiscovered user u ∈ U
5 while L1 is not empty do
6 L2← empty list
7 for each user ui ∈ L1 do
8 for each undiscovered user uj who sold to ui
do
9 W ⇐ number of items uj bought and
then sold
10 for each undiscovered user uk who sold
to uj do
11 if W > 0 then
12 (ca, cb)⇐ supply chain link
between (ui, uj) and (uj , uk),
divided by W
13 I ⇐ (ca, cb)
⋃
I
14 L2⇐ uj
⋃
L2
15 L1⇐ L2
is less time consuming. Moreover, a finer grained product
identification might be counterproductive for the analysis of
supply chains, as a large number of categories will result in
complicated visualizations.
a) Product Labeling: We identified 14 product categories
for our datasets (Table II). These categories were determined
by domain experts based on reading posts in both forums and
choosing products of interest in line with their analysis goals.
To adapt our classifiers to other forums, an analyst can modify
the categories to fit the forum. An alternative way of choosing
product categories might be to explore unsupervised clustering
methods [23], [42].
The product categories were annotated by domain experts
who have native fluency of the forum’s primary language. The
distributions of the annotations per source are shown in Table
II. Figure 11 in the appendix shows examples of what a post
classified other looks like. The other posts could not fit
into any of the product categories we already identified.
Both annotated datasets are highly unbalanced making the
classification task particularly hard. Unlike for Hack Forums,
however, our initial random Antichat data-sample had more
account posts than other. The ramification of this is that
when the classifier struggles to decide how to classify data
points it tends to put it into the account class. Since we
decided to prioritize precision for all of the classes, except
other, we decided to undersample account to be smaller
than other in our training sets. The effect of this is an
increase in precision of the account class but a decrease
in recall. The numbers we report for Antichat in Table II are
after undersampling the account class so that it is smaller
than the other class. This undersampled data was only used
for training our models. The natural distribution was used for
constructing testing sets and analysis.
b) Reply Labeling: We label each reply into three cat-
egories: buy, sell and other. The distribution of reply types
is highly dependant on the structure and rules of the forum
as shown in Table III. For example, there are not many sell
replies on Hack Forums relative to the other categories. Replies
labelled as other tend to be questions about products and
informational.
B. Validating Product Category and Reply Classifier
We extract features from posts using TF-IDF [3] to produce
a vector where each element corresponds to that term’s TF-IDF
score. We experiment with character and word n-grams. We
chose character n-grams as it outperformed word n-grams on
our datasets. We tested four classifiers: 1) FastText, 2) Logistic
Regression, 3) SVM, and 4) XGBoost. We tuned each of these
methods to reduce over-fitting of the labeled data [6], [17]. We
selected these four classifiers as a diverse set of classifier types
but we did not test an exhaustive set of classification methods.
For our product category classifier evaluation, we used
the labeled data described in Table II and classified each
post into one of 14 categories. We perform stratified 5-fold
validation of each classification algorithm since our classes
are highly imbalanced. For highly imbalanced datasets, regular
k-fold cross validation often produces a biased evaluation
because the limited number of folds generated can have a class
distribution that does not match the one in the actual data. We
use stratified k-fold validation since it ensures an “apples-to-
apples” evaluation where the same distribution of the target
values that exist in the main data set are maintained for each
fold [11].
In order to select the classifier used in our analysis, we
use a weighted average of the precision scores across all
the categories except other. We ignore the other class in
this metric because we are not concerned with having a low
precision in that category, since posts classified as other will be
filtered out by our supply chain identification algorithms; our
goal is to optimize the percentage of posts used in the supply
chain algorithm that truly belong in their given category.
Although other classifiers perform equally well as XGBoost
in weighted F1 scoring, we choose XGBoost for all product
classification tasks because it performs better in our weighted
non-other precision scoring metric providing a precision of
0.824 on Antichat and 0.734 on Hack Forums. We see the
performance when considering weighted precision in Table IV.
The remaining Antichat and Hack Forums product posts were
classified using the XGBoost models.
The second classification task used for identifying supply
chains is to categorize each reply to the first post in each
thread into one of three categories: buy, sell, or other. We
chose the categories based on the needs of the supply chain
algorithm. For our reply category classifier evaluation, we used
the labeled data described in Table III. We again perform
stratified 5-fold validation of each classification algorithm
since our classes are highly imbalanced.
Similarly a single classifier outperforms the rest in reply
classification, as seen in Table IV. By our weighted non-
other precision metric, Logistic Regression performed the best
across both datasets, providing 0.874 precision on Antichat
and 0.852 precision on Hack Forums. Although we care
about overall model performance, we want to ensure the
integrity of our supply chain links, described later, and a higher
precision would ensure that. In other words, we decided to
trade recalling potential classification for the legitimacy of the
classifications the models made.
Lastly, Table V depicts which classes across classifications
tasks performed the best and worst in terms of precision. We
theorize that sell performs the best in reply classification
because the wording of that text is more distinct than other
and buy. We argue a similar theory is likely for the crypter
product in both product classification tasks because the posts
advertising these products often use many of the same words.
Limitations in Classification: We tested four classifiers
with a small set of features over two forums. Our classifiers
could potentially be improved by identifying more useful
features, exploring additional classifiers, and diversifying the
forums used for testing. Our product category taxonomies are
also specific to the two forums that we analyzed and would
need to be modified for other forums.
C. Validating Supply Chain Link
We validate whether the chain link tuples output by our
algorithm describe “true” links in supply chains. A “true”
link is what we would consider a link in a supply chain,
not simply a coincidence where a user purchased something
and then sold something else, unrelated to the item they
purchased, or an error in classification resulting in the lack of
a purchase or even a product. For example, a user purchasing
a program that adds followers to any Instagram account, and
then subsequently selling a popular Instagram account is a
“true” link. To evaluate this, we manually check the links
produced by the algorithm.
Table VI shows the attenuated counts and percentages of
links that were an example of a forum member buying a
product and then selling another product that is produced using
the previous product in a supply chain fashion (related),
someone buying and then reselling the same item with a
slightly changed description (resell), and a user purchas-
ing one product and selling another where the two prod-
ucts are not related in any reasonable supply chain scenario
(unrelated). Table VI also displays attenuated counts and
percentages of links in which the product classifier determined
that a post belonged in one of our product categories; but in
truth, that post was not actually discussing selling a legitimate
product (Lack of product), or links with errors in reply
classification made it so that the link detected cannot be
Product Description Antichat Hack Forums
Account Selling or requesting an account, multiple accounts, or access codes. This also includes
account creation automation software.
19% 19%
Botnet Selling or renting access to computers infected with malicious software. 2% 1%
Crypter A piece of software which obfuscates malware. 2% 6%
DDoS service Selling or requesting a DDoS attack. 1% 4%
Hacked server Selling or requesting a single hacked server. 18% 1%
Hack-for-hire Offering targeted hacking, malware coding or requesting a specific service. 4% 7%
Hosting Hosting a website, game server, or otherwise maintaining it.This includes DDoS mitiga-
tion.
3% 4%
Malware A piece of malicious software that is executed on a victim’s machine. Examples of this
include cryptocurrency miners and ransomware.
8% 8%
Proxy Selling or requesting a proxy/VPN. 3% 1%
Social booster Supports gaining social media attention. Examples of this are, “buying likes/views”,
“selling a twitter followers”.
3% 3%
Spam tool Selling or requesting an email/chat service spam tool or spamming service. 9% 1%
Traffic Selling real or fake visitors to a site. Does not include social media related “traffic”. 5% 1%
Video game service Selling or requesting any service related to video games. Includes things like mods,
points, and power-leveling. Does not include selling video game accounts.
1% 10%
Other Anything that doesn’t fall into the previous categories. 22% 34%
TOTAL 18,796 14,557
Table II: Product annotation labels and distribution per source
Reply Type Description Antichat Hackforums
Buy Someone wants to buy or bought a product. 8% 12%
Sell Someone making a sale offer to the original poster of a thread. 8% 2%
Other Anything that didn’t fall into the previous categories. 84% 86%
TOTAL 9,992 5,898
Table III: Reply classification labels and distribution per source
Antichat Hack Forums
Product Reply Product Reply
Model Prec Recall F1 Prec Recall F1 Prec Recall F1 Prec Recall F1
FastText 0.824 0.734 0.764 0.823 0.318 0.450 0.722 0.582 0.627 0.800 0.427 0.539
Logistic Regression 0.831 0.718 0.753 0.874 0.245 0.381 0.617 0.564 0.617 0.852 0.363 0.492
SVM 0.817 0.748 0.767 0.654 0.213 0.301 0.716 0.578 0.614 0.812 0.332 0.440
XGBoost 0.824 0.677 0.729 0.713 0.227 0.328 0.734 0.577 0.627 0.819 0.352 0.465
Table IV: Weighted precision, recall and F1 scores of classifiers across datasets and tasks, with stratified k-fold cross-validation
Antichat Hack Forums
Top Reply sell (0.890) sell (0.893)
Low Reply buy (0.860) buy (0.828)
Top Product crypter (0.905) crypter (0.832)
Low Product other (0.502) spam-tool (0.497)
Table V: Highest and lowest categories across classifiers in
terms of precision
a supply chain link because the user who replied did not
purchase the product (Lack of purchase). Out of these,
links classified as related and resell are considered
proper supply chain links. Our algorithm outputs 31% related
and 5% resell in Hack Forums and 41% related and 17% resell
in Antichat.
“Algorithm Output” shows the attenuated counts and asso-
ciated percentages of links detected by our complete method
that fell into each Relevance Level. “Sample Baseline” shows
the same detected by only the supply chain algorithm (the
modified breadth-first search), without using the results of the
reply classifiers to filter links (i.e., without limiting links to
those created by “buy” replies).
Attenuation is performed to counter the effect of a few
outliers either buying or selling multiple times, which would
otherwise result in many links. The amount that each link
contributes to its respective relevance class is divided by the
total number of links that the linking user creates. For example,
if a user purchases one item and then sells many items,
resulting in many links, we want that user to contribute less to
each link validation type (mentioned in Table VI) where their
links belong than if they only created one or a few links with
the single purchase. If we don’t use attenuation, then outlier
users will affect the distribution of link validation types.
To determine if using our classifiers (to filter out other
Link Type Hack Forums Antichat
Link Type Algorithm Output Sample Baseline Algorithm Output Sample Baseline
Related 37 (31%) 4 (10%) 181 (41%) 18 (22%)
Resell 6 (5%) 1 (3%) 77 (17%) 12 (14%)
Unrelated 34 (28%) 1 (1%) 82 (18%) 26 (31%)
Lack of product 15 (12%) 0 (0%) 57 (13%) 23 (28%)
Lack of purchase 28 (24%) 30 (86%) 43 (10%) 4 (5%)
TOTAL 119 35 441 83
Table VI: Attenuated Link Truth Level by Forum. “Algorithm Output” provides attenuated values for links detected by our
complete method. “Sample Baseline” gives the same for links detected by only the Supply Chain Algorithm 1 without using
the results of the reply classifier to filter links (i.e., without limiting links to those created by “buy” replies). Related
links have a user who purchased a product and then sold another product likely using the previous one in a supply chain
fashion; (e.g., buying a hacked server and then selling DDoS attacks). Resell links have a user who purchased and resold
the same product, possibly with an updated description. Unrelated links have a user who purchased a product and sold
another unrelated product that is not likely to logically result from the source product. Lack of product happens when
the product classifier determines a post belongs in a product category, and feeds it to the Supply Chain Algorithm, but the
post was not actually discussing selling a product of interest (i.e., the product classifier labeled it as a product when in truth
it is “other”). Lack of purchase happens when the linking user did not actually indicate purchasing the source product,
so the link detected cannot be a supply chain link (i.e., the reply classifier labelled it as a “buy” reply, but in truth it was not).
Attenuation is performed to counter the effect of a user either buying or selling multiple times, which would otherwise result
in many links when combined.
product posts and limit to buy replies) increases the density of
valid links by disproportionately filtering out invalid links, we
manually validated all of the links we discovered after filtering.
For a baseline comparison, we used the supply chain algorithm
to find links, but without filtering using the results of the reply
classifier. We then manually evaluated a random sample of 100
of these unfiltered supply chains (note the number of links
after attenuation is 35 for Hack Forums and 83 for Antichat).
The results of our supply chain evaluation are in Table VI as
“Sample Baseline.” Considering “related” and “resell” links
as relevant, we find that our classifiers improves the rate of
relevant links from 13% to 36% for Hack Forums and from
36% to 58% for Antichat. It is infeasible to compute the recall
since there is no efficient method for identifying all relevant
links in our datasets.
A statistic of note in Table VI is that 86% of Hack Forums
sample baseline links are “Lack of purchase”; the vast majority
of these links were made using “vouching” replies. A vouching
reply is one in which the author vouches for the original
poster, claiming that they have worked with that user and
that the original poster can be trusted. This is likely because
the Hack Forums community places importance on vouches
to determine a user’s trustworthiness, so gangs of users post
vouching replies to each others’ posts, creating links.
Limitations in Supply Chain Generation: The main lim-
itation evident from this evaluation is that not every tuple is
a legitimate link, requiring manual exploration of the links
detected. However, we show that our algorithm finds fewer
non-legitimate links with the classifiers than without. This
issue, however, is indicative of an overarching limitation,
which is that we cannot be sure that all replies marked as “buy"
actually resulted in a transaction. For example, a user bidding
on an item was marked as a user wanting to purchase, but it
is possible someone outbid them, and they did not actually
receive the product.
Other limitations result from the timing part of our definition
of supply chains. For example, sometimes limiting supply
chain links to those where the user purchased the source
product before selling the destination product is an incorrect
constraint. For instance, a user could wait to buy a required
product for their offering until they have a customer. It may
also increase the percentage of relevant supply chain links
to have an upper limit for the amount of time between
interactions in a tuple; however, we then miss the cases when
there is a large delay.
Another limitation is that our notion of related products
is limited by our ability to correctly interpret these forum
messages and infer connections. Thus, we might have missed
some new supply chains because we did not deduce the
connection. However, we place an emphasis on precision to
reduce false positives at the cost of additional false negatives.
VI. ANALYSIS
This section contains analyses focused on providing useful
information to an analyst investigating underground forums.
We show how insight from these analyses can make an analyst
more efficient at detecting shifts in threats and understanding
general ecosystem trends. All the analysis in this section is
based on data classified by the best performing model for
each task: XGBoost for product classification and Logistic
Regression for reply classification. In every classification task,
aside from products in Hack Forums, the model was trained on
all the annotated posts and the remaining posts were predicted.
The Hack Forums product task is unique because we anno-
tated all the posts. In order to reclassify them, we performed
Figure 3: Antichat products trends. 73,115 posts in total. The right hand y-axis is the actual volume of posts, and the left
y-axis is the percentage of the total number of posts. The black line signifies the volume of post and is associated with the
right y-axis. In Antichat, accounts and hosting were most popular until the ecosystem diversified into mixed monthly
degrees of our 14 product taxonomy.
Figure 4: Hack Forums products trends. 14,447 posts in total. The right hand y-axis is the actual volume of posts, and the left
y-axis is the percentage of the total number of posts. The black line signifies the volume of post and is associated with the right
y-axis. In Hack Forums, product trends demonstrate a crypter beginning signifying the need to obfuscate malware/software.
This need became less dominant as the ecosystem become more diverse.
k-fold classification where all of the annotated product posts
were split into 5 folds. We then classified all of the posts in
one fold using a model trained on posts from the remaining
four folds and repeated this until all of the posts in the five
folds were classified and an XGBoost model trained on four
folds was used to predict the remaining fold. This was repeated
until each fold was predicted. We classified the Hack Forums
posts using this method so that we could provide a realistic
end-to-end assessment of our supply chain detection method
that included the likely misclassification error, assuming it is
not possible to label all of the posts.
A. Product Analysis
We performed time series and statistical analyses of the
classified and annotated product posts using the taxonomy
from Figures 3 and 4. The dataset analyzed is the one
described in Table I, with 73,115 threads in Antichat over
7 years, and 14,447 threads in Hack Forums over 6 years.
Of these, all of the 14,447 Hack Forums posts and 21,996
of the Antichat posts were manually annotated; the rest were
classified using an XGBoost classifier trained on the annotated
posts. We demonstrate how a product-level trend analysis gives
insight into what activity is present on a forum and how forums
change over time. Normally this requires manually reading
through hundreds of posts to get a sense of changes.
The first difference is between the initial illicit activity of
the two forums. Our Antichat data begins in Summer 2008
where the initial product offerings focused either on malicious
hosting and accounts.
Hack Forums, on the other hand, shows very different
beginnings, where most of the data we classified pertains to
crypters. This means most individuals were buying/selling
items related to obfuscating software. This implies a very
different story than Antichat, where there was likely initially
a demand for this single product. As time progresses, we
see Hack Forums become a more diverse marketplace, where
crypter related products become a fairly insignificant part
of new offerings.
The interesting similarity between the two forums is that as
volume increases we see that the product offerings become
more diverse. This indicates that these forums evolve into
ecosystems where specialized and likely more efficient sellers
start to organize into supply chains where one seller of
a higher level service, such as DDoS attacks, depends on
hacked servers supplied by other sellers. Similar to normal
business ecosystems, this likely enables increasingly efficient
and sophisticated attacks to emerge. These product category
trend analyses only show what is being sold but they do not
illuminate the connections between products.
Figure 5: Supply chains found in Hack Forums limited to
links manually validated as “Related” or “Resell”. Edges are
colored according to source product category, and have widths
determined by the number of users who purchased the source
product and sold the destination product. Numbers at the top
correspond to the level in the modified breadth-first search
algorithm at which the node was discovered. The number of
chains originating with each product category is denoted next
to the product category names. Each user contributes to each
link the amount determined by our method of attenuation. We
omitted for space two chains which were longer than level 4.
B. Supply Chain Analysis
To give a sense of the scale, the total number of posts
used was 14,557 and 51,119 for Hack Forums and Antichat,
respectively. Out of these, only posts with products classified
into categories outside other were used for supply chain
analysis; this was 9,601 for Hack Forums and 28,991 for
Antichat. The total number of links, when allowing posts with
other products is 1,041 and 9,043 links in Hack Forums and
Antichat, respectively, and when filtering out other product
posts is 233 and 1179 in Hack Forums and Antichat, respec-
tively. These same links with filtering out other products,
through attenuation, become 119 for Hack Forums and 441
for Antichat.
We produced alluvial graphs of the supply chains resulting
from our algorithms only including links manually labeled as
related or resell. Figures 5 and 6 depict these supply
chains as alluvial graphs for Hack Forums and Antichat,
respectively. There are 119 links in Hack Forums and 441
links in Antichat, after attenuation.
In both Hack Forums and Antichat, accounts as products
are central. In Antichat, the product that feeds most into
accounts is hacked-server, followed by malware and
spam-tool. The product most often produced by mem-
bers who purchased accounts is social-booster. This
makes sense according to domain experts, since hacked servers
are used to brute-force and create accounts, and acquiring a
large number of accounts helps to generate spam, social media
likes, clicks, etc. In Hack Forums, video-game-service
and accounts are heavily linked due to many of Hack
Forums’s users being avid gamers. Links from both forums
are discussed in more detail as case studies.
VII. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we demonstrate how an analyst can use the
supply chains to explore the criminal markets, understand how
products are derived, and what popular supply chains say about
an underground forum marketplace. All the following case
studies are only based on the derived supply chains. These
case studies demonstrate the value and utility of extracting
supply chains have in determining the origins of a specific
crime or the use cases for products in our taxonomy.
A. Hack Forums
1) Valuable accounts: One common type of business in
Hack Forums, made apparent through supply chain link
analysis, is selling social boosted accounts. This situation
occurs when a user buys a social-booster to boost the
“follower” or “like” count of a social media account, and
then later sells the account for a premium because of the
higher social status. Of the 589 (unattenuated) supply chain
links extracted from the classified Hack Forums data, 3% were
instances of social boosting and selling an account. A simple
example that appeared in the Hack Forums dataset was an
instance where a user purchased a service which promised
Twitter follows, and later sold a “pre-made” Twitter with 2k
followers. Some of these groomed accounts were “eWhore”
accounts (they are intended to appear to be owned by either
an attractive man or woman), which we discovered are sold
to romance scammers. This illuminated a connection between
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Figure 6: Supply chains found in Antichat, limited to links manually validated as “Related” or “Resell”. Edges are colored
according to source product category, and have widths determined by the number of users who purchased the source product
and sold the destination product. Numbers at the top correspond to the level in the modified breadth-first search algorithm
at which the node was discovered. Number of chains originating with each product category are denoted next to the product
category names. Each user contributes to each link the amount determined by our method of attenuation.
social-booster services and romance scammers which
was not mentioned in prior work studying these scams [15].
The value of an account is also dependent on the rarity
of the handle. On Hack Forums, these accounts are referred
to as “OG,” which stands for “original gangster”, and 32%
of our account links mention this term [20]. Our supply
chains depict these “OG” accounts exchanging hands, and an
overwhelming 60% of the links where “OG” is mentioned
in the destination category come from an account source
category. That being said, in order to obtain an “OG” account
if an actor is not purchasing it directly, they must discover who
the owner of the account is so that they can attempt to take over
the account using methods such as phishing or SIM swapping
attacks [22]. Furthermore, going from an “OG” username to
personally identifiable information (PII) can happen through
doxing [34]. In our taxonomy, we categorized doxing under
hack-for-hire. There is an example link where the source
category is an actor advertising a doxing service (hack-for-
hire) and the purchaser of the service then sells a stolen “OG”
account.
2) DDoS, botnets, and their crypter roots: It is possible
to understand the botnet supply chains through supply
chain links in Hack Forums. Many DDoS and botnet related
criminal activities originate on Hack Forums [21]. For in-
stance, the authors of the Mirai botnet, which launched a
devastating attack against the Dyn DNS service, originally
posted on Hack Forums [21]. Suppose there is a cyber-
security analyst which is interested in what purchases, or
supply chain links, on Hack Forums lead to someone sell-
ing a botnet. The categories which flow into botnet
are malware, proxy and account and the categories
which flow in ddos-service are account, hosting,
ddos-service, hack-for-hire, traffic, proxy,
malware, video-game-service, and crypter. As-
suming further that the analyst is interested in the technical
aspects of the ddos-service, they may be inclined to
discover which crypters were purchased before a service is
offered. These crypter to ddos-service chains are rare,
and in fact this one type only makes up less than 1% of all
the found chains. Thus, for an analyst to stumble across this
specific supply chain interaction on their own, they would
need to find the needle in a haystack. With the help of our
derived chains, we can see that the specific crypter works
via Java drive-by download, which could lead an analyst to
further investigate which systems are susceptible to this kind
of exploit, infected with botnet malware obfuscated by the
crypter, and carrying out DDoS attacks.
B. Antichat
The supply chains observed in Antichat can broadly be
broken down into two main classes: vk.com - 412 links
related (without attenuation) and other - 232 links related.
The distinction between the classes is based on whether the
service provided is related to vk.com. Contrary to common
beliefs [27], it appears that much of the observed supply chains
are centered around the Russian internal market rather than
those outside of Russia. All of the following analysis is based
on the extracted supply chains.
1) vk.com Relevant Supply chains: Figure 7 shows the
supply chains where either the seller or the buyer provided a
service on the vk.com platform. It should be noted that in the
context of vk, proxy means proxy accounts for spamming,
crypter refers to a mechanism to hide the external link
from vk’s fraudulent websites detector, and malware refers to
ways to steal accounts that are either root-kits or fake websites.
The graphs showcase that, by far the, most bought and sold
asset is an account. Those accounts are a crucial part of the
infrastructure, and all of the services bought and sold end up
sinking into accounts in at least one of the supply chain stages.
First, it can also be seen that the accounts exchange hands
quite a bit. We observed 5 different types of accounts:
• Clean (Chistie) accounts – accounts that are freshly
acquired and previously belonged to real people. People
buying those accounts were interested in either reselling
the internal currency stored on the account, benefiting
from the account’s rating, using the account for later
spamming, or providing some sort of social boosting,
such as voting or inviting people to events. Additionally,
criminals sometimes buy those accounts to use as a
springboard to get access to other services with the same
password.
• Spammed (Prospam) accounts – accounts that were pre-
viously used to send out spam in the form of personal
messages or messages on communal boards in different
groups. Those accounts are likely about to be noticed by
the anti-spam system, so criminals that are only interested
in spam sell them at lower prices. The accounts can still
be used for all of the other uses listed for Clean accounts.
• Invited (Proinvite) accounts – accounts that are used to
invite people into various communities. Those are now
considered very similar to spammed accounts, but at that
time, vk.com treated them very differently in the detection
phase, and criminals saw the difference between the two.
Similarly to Spammed accounts, the accounts themselves
can be used for all of the non-invite activities with low
risks of getting caught.
• Non-valid (Nevalid) accounts – accounts on which the
password has either been changed or been incorrectly
collected. Criminals can use those accounts to log into
other services, e.g., their e-mail provider or other social
networks.
• Auto-registered (Avtoreg) accounts – the accounts that
were automatically registered and are used for the pur-
poses of spam or social boosting. Those accounts look
natural, have real human-like behavior, subscribe to
groups, like messages, and occasionally make posts.
Several types of these accounts exchanging hands are
usually spammers and criminals interested in group-invite
services, disposing of the accounts they can no longer use.
At the same time, users providing social-booster services are
buying more accounts than they sell, suggesting that the vast
majority of the accounts used for such services are either
getting banned and thus cannot be sold again, or are not getting
caught at all and can be used forever.
The supply chains also suggest that there is quite a bit of
reselling taking place. Out of 276 exchanges of hands, 136
were talking about the same product with either no or minor
changes to the description of the product. This makes sense for
services included in categories like malware, but are quite
surprising for services like proxy, social booster, or
account. There are two possible explanations as to why that
might happen: 1) just as in any market, this market is ruled
by supply and demand; 2) prior work has shown that users
are more likely to buy from somebody reputable [30]. High
rated users could be buying products from lesser rated users
and reselling them for higher prices.
Criminals buying accounts consume proxies, social
boosters, and malware to sell more accounts. Those
supply chains suggest that the combination of the above
provide an efficient way to harvest more accounts. At the
same time, every social booster supply chain consumes
a lot of malware and accounts, which suggests that there
is an actual market driving vk.com account demand and the
previously used accounts are getting aggressively banned.
2) non-vk.com-related supply chains: The first thing that
becomes apparent is that the largest chunk of the remaining
supply chains is centered around hacked servers and
their operation. The second largest group is account; how-
ever, those accounts are mostly email accounts and not
from vk.com. People acquire dedicated servers in order to
brute-force either email accounts or other dedicated servers.
Similarly, one can see that malware is being consumed and
later feeds into accounts and hacked servers. One of
those chains is a person who bought a bruter, and the other one
is a person buying a remote exploit. Abuse-tolerant VPNs and
proxies are being used in this infrastructure as well, and all rely
on hacked dedicated servers. Some of the dedicated servers
have clear indications that they were previously used for poker
or spam, suggesting that reselling might be happening due to
blacklisting.
VIII. DISCUSSION
a) Performance: Table VII demonstrates the time re-
quired to derive the chains presented in the evaluation. The
product classification, reply classification and BFS link gen-
eration was all run on machines with 64 vCPUs and 416 GBs
of memory.
b) Limitations: Despite both forums operating for almost
a decade, we were only able to identify a few hundred supply
chains across them. Yet, the analysis presented should be
considered a lower bound estimation of the supply chains
on the forums for the following reasons. First, the biggest
reduction in the number of links considered was the choice
of categories. Without limiting the links to those describing
■account (4)
■traffic (1)
■social_booster (2)
■malware (4)
■hacked_server (4)
■spam_tool (0)
■crypter (0)
■hosting (2)
■proxy (2)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Figure 7: Supply chains found in Antichat, limited to links involving vk.com. Edges are colored according to source product
category, and have widths determined by the number of users who purchased the source product and sold the destination
product. Numbers at the top correspond to the level in the modified breadth-first search algorithm at which the node was
discovered. The number of chains originating with each product category is denoted next to the product category names. Each
user contributes to each link the amount determined by our method of attenuation.
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Figure 8: Supply chains found in Antichat, limited to links not involving vk.com, and validated as “Related” or “Resell”.
Edges are colored according to source product category, and have widths determined by number of users who purchased the
source product and sold the destination product. Numbers at the top correspond to the level in the modified breadth-first search
algorithm at which the node was discovered. Number of chains originating with each product category are denoted next to the
product category names. Each user contributes to each link the amount determined by our method of attenuation.
products that we are interested in (i.e., without filter posts
classified as other), there were 1041 links in Hack Forums
and 9043 links in Antichat, which were reduced down to 692
(66%) and 1179 (13%), respectively. Note that not all of those
links are actually related, but those numbers are indicative of
the reduction in scale.
Antichat Hack Forums
Annotation ∼2720 ∼2720
Product classification ∼32 ∼27
Reply classification ∼1 ∼7
BFS link generation <1 <1
Total (Minutes) 1393 1394
Total (Hours) ∼23.21 ∼23.23
Table VII: Performance times for the entire process of supply-
chain extraction. All values are in minutes unless stated
otherwise. The annotation time is based on an expected 10
seconds per post with a total of > 8000 posts per task (> 16000
per data set).
Second, as we chose to prioritize the precision of the
classifiers, our models were very conservative. Third, to re-
emphasize the importance of precision, when choosing what
counts as “evidence” of purchasing a product, our reply
annotators were conservative, excluding mere indications of
slight interest as “evidence” of purchasing in a reply.
Finally, our supply chains were constructed from the public
part of the forums that feature only a subset of interactions
between criminals. Moreover, we only considered the replies
users left under the corresponding selling post and not the
reply under the member account.
We could have been less conservative and identified addi-
tional supply chains at the cost of increased false positives
resulting in increased manual review time.
We did not have access to the user profile pages where
additional indications of buying could be found. However,
these are public and could be collected and analyzed likely
revealing additional chains. The challenge with using profile
feedback is that it is often not attributed to a specific post.
Our methods are fairly agnostic only requiring the ability
to discover selling and buying indicators. Thus, our methods
could likely be extended to identify supply chains within other
types of data sources such as online social networks and instant
messaging cybercrime groups.
c) Practical Usage: Prior work demonstrated the prob-
lem with cross-domain prediction in underground forums [10].
Therefore, we generate a separate model for each of the
forums. In order to build a well-performing classifier for new
forums, it would likely require labeling of around 6,000 –
8,500 posts by a domain expert. These estimates are based on
the learning curves included in the appendix (Figures 12 and
13). From our experience, this takes about 2-3 person-days of
effort for a domain expert.
It should be noted that even within a single forum content
shift over time proves a barrier to product category classi-
fication. We performed tests to investigate a recommended
re-annotation cycle. We compared the performance of the
classifiers trained on 200 posts from different months and
tested on the two last months of both Antichat and Hack
Forums’ forums. For both of these forums we noticed that the
accuracy was better the closer the training set was to the test
set in terms of time. Antichat F1 scores went from about 0.15
at the farthest to about 0.35 at the closest, and Hack Forums
F1 scores went from about 0.05 at the farthest to about 0.4 at
the closest. Since the training set size was 200, these scores are
very low, but show that proximity in time between the training
set and test set is important when classifying products on those
forums.
Finally, while classifying replies, we made use of the quote
removal algorithm, which searched each reply for string quotes
citing previous replies in the same thread. Implemented in a
practical system, it would be more appropriate to use features
specific to the forum to detect quotations, such as html tags.
d) Are there any other interesting supply chains?: As
was mentioned before, the supply chains extracted in this paper
were mainly limited by the chosen categories while the product
posts outside of them were classified as other. In the case of
Antichat, our product taxonomy only described about a tenth
of the links in the forum. Whilst skimming through the other
links, we discovered a lot of related and interesting ones.
For example, when vk.com introduced internal currency, many
different users started buying services moving the currency in
and out of vk.com. At the same time, we saw quite a few
users buying and selling the development of vk.com-internal
flash casinos. Similarly, when vk.com introduced a phone
verification requirement for account registration, more chains
were related to buying SMS-activations and phone malware.
While those categories were not considered in this paper,
our methods allow an analyst to capture those chains if needed
by changing the category taxonomy.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed, implemented, validated, and
analyzed a set of methods that can identify underground
cybercrime forum supply chains. Our approach is the first step
toward automating the discovery of supply chains, which can
significantly reduce the manual effort required to analyze these
forums. We have shown how those supply chains can be used
to understand the collaboration in cybercriminal forums and
help with providing insights into major security incidents such
as the Mirai botnet attacks and Target data breach.
Previous approaches struggled with the identification of sup-
ply chains within these forums, requiring tremendous amounts
of analyst time and subject matter expertise. We show that it
is possible to discover common connections between products
within these large-scale forums based on our semi-supervised
method. We show that our method can potentially be used to
identify more effective methods of undermining attacks. More
research is needed to fully automate to the discovery of supply
chains.
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APPENDIX A
LEARNING CURVES
Figure 9: Reply Classification Learning Curves
Russian
Figure 10: Reply Classification Learning Curves
English
APPENDIX B
CONFUSION MATRIX HEAT MAPS
1) chicken proofreading service |
fast, reliable | cheap you need
homework done?
2) snapbacks for sale!!! yo what’s up
hf i got 30+ snapbacks never worn
before.
3) [selling] lenovo erazer x700
decided to sell this bad boy since
i use my macbook more than it.
Figure 11: Examples other posts in Hack Forums
Figure 12: Product Classification Learning Curves
Antichat (Russian)
Figure 13: Product Classification Learning Curves
Hackforums (English)
Figure 14: Reply Classification Confusion Matrix
Antichat (Russian)
Figure 15: Reply Classification Confusion Matrix
Hackforums (English)
Figure 16: Product Classification Confusion Matrix
Antichat (Russian)
Figure 17: Product Classification Confusion Matrix
Hackforums (English)
